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1. The current state of affairs
•	 Under	 the	rule	of	Vladimir	Putin	 in	Russia,	an	authoritarian	system	has	
been	created	in	which	the	rule	of	the	President,	based	on	broad	formal	pre-










•	 The	 Russian	 economy	 is	 largely	 dependent	 for	 its	 income	 on	 energy	 ex-






























































•	 In	the	economic	sphere,	 the	main	challenge	is	 the	fall	 in	performance	of	









the	West,	 especially	 the	US,	 has	 reached	 a	 dangerous	 level	 for	Moscow,	
and	incurred	significant	costs.	Therefore	the	biggest	challenge	for	Russia	
is	 the	 escalation	of	 its	 conflict	with	 the	United	States.	Another	problem	


































technology	 from	the	West,	and	force	Russia	 to	bear	 the	costs	of	develop-






tion	may	appear	 in	 certain	places,	 for	 reasons	 including	public	protests,	






















































































































The	 ambition	 of	 this	 report	 is	 not	 to	 provide	 a	 comprehensive	 and	 in-depth	


























I. THE PolITIcal and SocIal SITuaTIon
1. The current state of affairs
Vladimir Putin’s third presidential term (2012–18) saw a clear sharpening 


























and	control	 over	political	 and	 social	processes;	 as	 such,	 they	 remain	 the	
guarantee	of	security	for	the	political	elites	who	govern	Russia.




























of	 the	 leader	and	his	entourage,	and	mostly	constitute	payment	 for	one’s	
loyalty	or	service.


























































•	 strengthening the institutions of force and	expanding	the	competence	
of	the	special	services	(particularly	the	Federal	Security	Service);	in	addi-
tion,	the	creation	(in	2016)	of	the	National	Guard,	which	could	potentially	







•	 establishing the functions of the justice and prison system not only 











A key tool of legitimacy	for Russian	authoritarianism	in	the	eyes	of	the	gen-
eral	public	 is	state propaganda,	which	contains	elements	of	disinformation	
or	even	of	psychological	warfare.	Its	basis	is	the	fuelling of isolationist senti-
ments	and	the militarisation of public discourse by	the	authorities	and	the	






































Putin’s	third	term	the	polls	showed	an	unprecedentedly	high level of a sense 
of national pride and satisfaction with the activities of the authorities.	
The	apogee	of	this	support	was	recorded	after	the	annexation	of	Crimea	(March	
2014),	which	sparked	social	euphoria.	By	using	mechanisms	for	strengthening	
national	identity	by	referring	to	an	external	enemy,	the Kremlin has direct-




slightly	–	which	on	 the	one	hand	 is	 linked	 to	 the	noticeable	deterioration	of	
the	population’s	economic	situation,	and	on	the	other	with	growing	fatigue	at	
the	present	regime	–	support	for	him	still	remains	at	above	80%.	However,	it	
must	be	noted	that	this	support	is	largely declarative, and is due to any lack 


























Figure 1. Support for Putin (in answer to the question “Do you support the 







2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
I support it
I do not support it
[%]
In 2018 the Levada Center was forced to suspend the publication of opinion polls concerning domestic 
politics in connection with the presidential elections, because the government had assigned it the status 
of a ‘foreign agent’, which prohibits it engaging in activities related to the political sphere.
Source: Levada Center https://www.levada.ru/indikatory/odobrenie-organov-vlasti/ 
Figure 2. Public trust in institutions (in answer to the question “To what 
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mains	high	regardless	of	the constantly deteriorating financial situation of 
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However,	in recent years an increase in	the number of protests	connected 

































Social dissatisfaction with a political background (demands	for	changes	to	





























































ninov,	 the	 former	head	of	 the	customs	service.	At	 the	same	time,	 the	elite’s	
sense	 of	 security	 is	 being	 reduced	 by	 external	 factors:	Western	 (especially	
























The effects of the personalisation of power.	 Since	 2000	 Russia	 has	 been	
witnessing	a	progressive	centralisation	of	power,	relying	on	the	construction	






































No reliable diagnosis of social sentiments in the context of the system’s 
failures in governing the state.	The	opposition	figure	Aleksei	Navalny’s	suc-
cessful	mobilisation	of	the	Russian	people’s	potential	for	political	protest	on	
the	basis	 of	 anti-corruption	 slogans	was	met	by	 the	Kremlin	with	 surprise	
and	alarm.	Although	the	scale	of	the	protests,	and	even	more	so	public	support	
for	Navalny	himself,	is	objectively	small,	in	favourable	conditions	his	charis-
ma	and	 strong	political	 instinct	 could	break	 the	 existing	paradigm	of	 rela-
tions	between	the	authoritarian	government	and	the	passive	public.	Although	
the	Kremlin	has	repeatedly	proved	its	effectiveness	at	neutralising	public	pro-











This	 involves the risk that the potential for protest with an economic 








































The	challenges	outlined	above	do not at present seem to pose a serious risk 
to the stability of the system,	although	they	will	certainly	affect	domestic	
policy	in	Russia	during	the	period	2018–24.	The	dynamics	of	the	situation	will	
be	shaped	on	the	basis	of	three	main	factors:
1. plans for Putin’s future position (after 2024) within the system, and the con-
stitutional changes associated with them;
2. the situation in the federal and regional ruling elites;
3. the dynamics of the public mood.
The introduction of constitutional changes allowing Putin to remain in 































With	regard	to	Putin’s	fourth	term,	the collapse of the system does not seem 
likely	(the	benefits	of	maintaining	the	system	are	still	greater	than	the	costs,	
both	in	the	eyes	of	the	elite	and	the	general	public,	who	fear	what	might	hap-
pen	during	an	‘interregnum’),	although manifestations of its gradual desta-







The government will not opt for any systemic reforms,	despite	Putin’s	use	





will therefore be to maintain the system,	 indicating	the	need	to	continue	








In	the	coming	years,	we	should not expect any serious threats to the sta-





on	a	more	significant	scale	 is	more	 likely	to	occur	 in	response	to	serious	er-



























an escalation of public dissatisfaction will	be	deepened	by	the	state’s	policy	
of	limiting	funding	for	social	assistance	planned	for	the	next	few	years,	which	
is	to	be	targeted	or	ad hoc	in	nature	(see	part	II.	Economy).	
However, in	 the	 Kremlin’s	 perception,	maintaining the Putin model de-
pends not on the prosperity and prospects of the public, but first of all 
























Paradoxically, shoring up the political sphere threatens to increase the 

























1. The present state of affairs
The	raw-materials	economy	model
Russia’s economic successes during Putin’s rule, especially during his 
first two terms, were closely connected with a rise in the prices of natu-
ral raw materials, mainly crude oil.	The	flow	of	petrodollars	and	the	spare	
production	capacity	after	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union	gave	impetus	to	Rus-
sia’s	dynamic	growth	at	the	beginning	of	Putin’s	rule.	
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Average price of barrel of Urals oilGDP growth
[%] [US$/bbl]
Source: the Russian Ministry of Finance, www.minfin.ru, 2018; Rosstat, www.gks.ru
Russia’s dependency on the energy sector has risen over the last 18 years 
(apart	from	periods	of	crises).	The oil and gas industries in particular have 
gained economic and political strategic importance.	Russia	is	a	key	global	






to	an	 increase	of	GDP	of	over	75%.	During	 this	 time,	budgetary	expenditure	
nominally	rose	by	a	factor	of	12;	this	allowed	an	increase	in	expenditure,	par-
ticularly	on	defence	(nominally	from	$5	billion	to	over	$50	billion	in	current	


























Figure 5. The share of revenue from exports of energy resources in the Rus-
sian budget, year on year, and the share of the energy sector in Russia’s GDP 
(in percent, in 2000–16)
200520042003200220012000 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Share of the energy sector in budget income from taxation (in percent)








Source: authors’ calculations based on data published by the Russian Ministry of Energy, 
www.minenergo.gov.ru; the Russian Ministry of Finance, www.minfin.ru; Rosstat, www.gks.ru
The	petrodollars	flowing	into	Russia	led	to	an increase in the central bank’s 
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Gold and currency reserves of the Russian Central Bank (total)
Stabilisation Fund
Reserve Fund + National Prosperity Fund
Source: Central Bank of Russia, www.cbr.ru, 2018; the Russian Ministry of Finance, www.minfin.ru, 2018
The	state’s	dominant	role	in	the	economy
At	the	end	of	his	first	presidential	term,	Putin	initiated processes aimed at 
strengthening the role of the state in the economy and limiting the func-
tioning of market mechanisms in Russia.
Above	all,	there has been a process of renationalisation and concentration 








machinery	 sector,	 including	 the	arms	 industry)	 and	Rosatom	(nuclear	pow-


























Figure 7. The share of state companies in the production of Russian oil in 








Source: authors’ calculations based on data published by CDU TEK (www.cdu.ru) from 2000 to 2018
The Russian President plays a key role in the decision-making processes 










In	 addition,	 the process of	Russia’s integration with the world economy 
which	had	been observed	during	Putin’s	first	two	terms	has been reversed.	
Russia’s	aggressive	foreign	policy	and	the	hardening	of	Russia’s	negotiating	po-





























2. The main challenges
The	main	 economic	 challenge	 for	 the	 Russian	 government	 remains	 the ex-
haustion of the present raw material-based model of economic develop-
ment.	This	 is	mostly	predicated	on	external	 factors	over	which	 the	Russian	
authorities	have	limited	influence:	fluctuations	of	prices,	and	trends	on	export	
markets	which	do	not	favour	Russia.	The	degree	to	which	Russia	is	dependent	






Another	challenge	for	Moscow	remains	the	negative trends on the energy 
markets,	including	the	European	market	which	is	strategically	important	for	





caused	by	 regulatory	 changes,	 in	particular	 the	 so-called	 energetic	 liberali-
sation	packages,	as	well	as	the	enforcement	of	the	EU	competition	rules	(the	
initiation	 in	 2012	 of	 antitrust	 proceedings	 against	 Gazprom).	 Secondly,	 the	
attempts	EU	member	states	have	made	to	diversify	their	supply	sources	have	
been	important,	in	particular,	the	development	of	infrastructure	allowing	im-
ports	of	LNG.	Thirdly,	 industry	forecasts	of	 increased	consumption	of	gas	 in	
Europe	have	been	modified	to	the	detriment	of	Russia.	Russia’s	dependence	on	
the	European	gas	market	has	been	reinforced	by	the	fact	that	Moscow has so 
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UE Europe outside the EU post-Soviet states others
[bcm]
Source: authors’ calculations based on data published by Gazprom, www.gazprom.ru 
The	 situation	 on	 the	Asian	markets,	which	Moscow	had	 seen	 as	 promising,	
is	also	evolving	unfavourably	 for	Russia.	Although	 in	2016	Russia	succeeded	








Another	 potential	 challenge	 to	Russia	 remains	 the	 sanctions policy of the 




The Russian authorities will have to also deal with internal problems, es-
pecially with their aging society.	According	to	Rosstat,	in	December	2017	the	
size	of	the labour	force	in	Russia	was	estimated	at	76.5	million,	i.e.	52%	of	the	
total	 population	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation.	 According	 to	 current	 estimates,	
the	labour	market	will	be	reduced	by	around	800,000–900,000	people	annu-



































Figure 9. Russia’s population structure by age 

























Source: Rosstat, www.gks.ru, 2018
Another	major	problem facing	the	Russian	authorities	is	the shortage of in-





































entering	Russia	 in	 that	period,	meanwhile,	have	been	focused	 in	 the	energy	
sector,	confirming	the	Russian	economy’s	dependence	on	it.

































Source: Rosstat, www.gks.ru, 2018
3. Prospects
We should not expect during Putin’s fourth term that Russia will free it-































At the same time, another economic collapse is unlikely.	This	is	due	to	rel-










It is unlikely that the unfavourable trends for Russia on the European en-
ergy market will change.	As	a	consequence,	Moscow’s	plans	for	a	significant	
increase	in	exports	to	Europe	(particularly	in	the	gas	sector)	seem	unrealistic.	





At	the	same	time,	contrary	to	Russian	declarations,	the Chinese market will 







will most	likely	force the authorities to take certain actions with the aim of 
improving the efficiency of the current system.	Social	policy	remains	one	of	
the	main	priorities	of	the	Russian	budget,	and	it	will	absorb	the	majority	of	the	
funding	 (around	30%	of	 total	expenditure).	The	changes	 implemented,	how-
ever,	will	probably	be	tactical	and	selective	in	nature.	In	the	next	few	years,	we	

































We should not expect any real changes to improve the investment climate 






In summary, the most likely scenario for the development of the econom-
ic situation in Russia during Vladimir Putin’s fourth term is economic 
stagnation: a slight increase, but still below the global average. At the 
same time, this new variant seems to be fully acceptable to Putin’s cur-

























1. The current state of affairs








The strategic objectives of the Kremlin’s	foreign policy have remained un-
changed.	These	are	as	follows:
1. weakening the position of the united States: ‘dethroning’ the uS from 
its role as the ‘guarantor’ of liberal global governance;
2. revising the security order in the Euro-atlantic area, and
3. creating a regional order within the post-Soviet region, dominated by 
russia, by means including the build-up of integration structures sub-
ordinate to moscow. 
During Putin’s third presidential term (2012–18), Russia’s foreign policy 
was characterised by increased assertiveness, in comparison with the 
















































cal	forces.	The most spectacular example of Russia’s ‘information war’ 














































































































































































































In	the	post-Soviet	area,	the	Kremlin has initiated attempts to deepen and 










tegration	 to	 the	process	of	Eurasian	economic	 integration,	 and	 its	 attempts	
to	encourage	Kiev	to	join	the	EAEU	led	to	war	with	Ukraine	and	open	politi-






















































































































































































































































































As its conflict with the West deepened, Russia activated a global policy 
in an attempt to strengthen its bargaining position towards the West 
by developing economic, political and military relationships with non-
Western partners. This purpose was also served by its attempts to inter-
fere in regional conflicts, in order to demonstrate to the West that these 
conflicts could not be ended without the cooperation of Russia, and on 
its terms.	The	Kremlin	has	made	a	particular	effort	to	strengthen its rela-
tionship with China.	In	the	context	of	its	worsening	conflict	with	the	West,	
Russia	agreed	(after	more	than	a	decade	of	negotiations)	a	long-term	contract	
for	 the	export	of	 its	natural	 gas	and	 the	 construction	of	 a	gas	pipeline	be-
tween	the	two	countries;	it	also	agreed	to	supply	China	with	technological-
ly	advanced	weapons	systems	(S-400	air	defence	systems,	Su-35	multi-role	
fighters);	 and	 intensified	 military	 cooperation	 between	 the	 two	 countries	
(including	joint	exercises,	including	in	strategically	‘sensitive’	areas	such	as	
the	Baltic	Sea,	the	Mediterranean	Sea,	the	Sea	of	Japan	and	the	South	China	






Most impressive, however, has been the return of Russia as a great power 









a	regional	 ‘concert	of	powers’.	 In	addition,	 it	has	become	a	major	partner	for	
such	regionally	important	countries	as	Egypt,	Israel,	Iraq,	and	(in	the	context	
of	 coordinating	policy	on	oil	 exports)	Saudi	Arabia.	Russia	 also	obtained	an	
important	position	for	itself	as	a	player	in	Libya.
This assertive policy has brought the Kremlin significant short-term 
























out	the	successful	‘rescue’	operation	of	the	Assad	regime	in	Syria, the Kremlin 
has managed to create a sense among the Russian public that Russia is re-
gaining or has regained the status of a great power, which automatically 
resulted in a boost in support for Putin.
2. The main challenges
Putin’s third term saw a collapse of the ‘soft revisionism’ strategy that 
had hitherto been optimal for Russia. The level of conflict with the United 
States has come dangerously close – from the Kremlin’s point of view – to 
a level where there is a risk of open and direct confrontation.	The	Krem-
lin	knows	that	it	cannot	win	such	a	confrontation	because	of	its	overall	power	
disparity	with	the	West.	
A growing problem for the Kremlin is Western, especially US sanctions 
(particularly economic),	which	are	the	price	Russia	has	paid	for	its	aggres-
sion	 towards	Ukraine.	Although	 they	are	bearable	 in	 the	 short	 term,	 in	 the	
longer	term	they	will	call	 into	question	the	model	of	Russia’s	economic	rela-
tions	with	the	West	which	has	effectively	been	operating	until	2014,	and	has	







The conflict Russia initiated with Ukraine in the Donbas is a major prob-







In addition, it has turned out that Russia’s non-Western partners,	who	
have	 declared	 their	 support	 for	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 new	multi-polar	 international	
order,	are ready to adopt a position of, at most, ‘benevolent neutrality’, 























conflict	between	Russia	and	the	West. This is also true of Moscow’s strong-
est ‘strategic partner’, namely China. Moreover,	economic	cooperation	with	
non-Western	partners	cannot	replace	access	to	Western	markets,	capital	and	
technology	for	the	Russian	economy.	At	the	same	time,	the	growing	disparity	









Nor is Russia’s position on the Middle East based on permanent founda-
tions.	The	armed	conflict	in	Syria	is	continuing,	and	what	is	worse,	it	threat-






There are three possible scenarios for Russian foreign policy during Pu-
tin’s fourth presidential term: defensive-transactional, confrontational-
crisis and inertial-opportunist.





of	 the	Russian	 regime	by	 the	West.	Such	a	 scenario	 seems	 likely	only	 if	 the	
Kremlin	comes	to	the	conclusion	that	in	the	long	term	the	West’s	potential	will	
be	 strengthened	 or	 consolidated,	 and	will	 be	 used	more	 assertively	 against	


































tions	with	 the	United	States;	 that	 the	American	 economic	 sanctions	will	 be	




1. a sudden but short-term ‘window of opportunity’ in the form of a shift in the 
balance of forces in the European theatre in favour of Russia (for example, 
if the United States becomes entangled in an armed conflict in the Far East); 
2. the emergence of a clear prospect of a sudden change to the balance of power 
to the detriment of Russia, for example, if Washington introduces drastic 
economic/financial sanctions.







































The inertial-opportunist	model	 is	 also	 possible,	 especially	 if	 the	 Kremlin	







aggressive	 exploitation	 of	 emerging	 opportunities	 to	 demonstrate	 Russia’s	
military	abilities,	its	potential	to	harm	Western	interests,	and	to	create	prob-
lems	for	whose	resolution	Russia	would	be	essential.	The main objective of 
such a policy would be to limit conflict with the West, and especially the 
United States, without losing the ‘assets’ acquired by Russia in 2014–16. 
The ideal from the Kremlin’s point of view would be to force the West to 
accept Russia’s ‘acquisitions’ and to return the relationship (especially in 
the economic sphere) to the state it was before 2014.
To achieve this goal, the Kremlin will paradoxically use the methods of 







also	 expect	 to	 see	 Russia	 undertaking	 information	warfare,	 based	 on	 caus-
ing	or	aggravating	internal	or	international	conflicts	which	could	backfire	on	
Western	interests.
In this scenario, the Kremlin would continue its existing strategy to-
wards Ukraine in order to force it to implement the Minsk agreements 
in their Russian interpretation, which	 are	 intended	 to	 bring	 about	 the	
creation	 of	 constitutional	 tools	 allowing	 Russia	 to	 block	 Ukraine’s	 integra-

































An important element of the Russian strategy in both these last two sce-
narios (the confrontational-crisis and the inertial-opportunist) is predi-
cated on a ‘breakdown’ of the political synchronisation of Western policy 
towards Russia, and in general on the creation and expansion of tensions 
between Washington and its European allies.	This	will	be	based	on	a	search	
for	 ‘sectoral’	normalisations	 (‘resets’)	with	 individual	 states,	particularly	by	





tary	relations	with	its	non-Western	partners.	Above all, Russia will continue 
to strive,	despite	all	the	perceived	disadvantages, to deepen and strengthen 




Despite	 the	 failure	of	Russia’s	policy	 towards	Ukraine,	 the	Kremlin	will	not	
deviate	from	the	course	of	reintegrating	the	post-Soviet	area	under	 its	aegis	
and	blocking	the	integration	of	the	countries	within	that	area	with	Western	
structures.	Russia will continue to seek both to deepen the economic inte-
gration within the framework of the EAEU, and to include new members	
in	this organisation (e.g.	by	pressing	Azerbaijan	and/or	Tajikistan	to	join).	By	
exploiting	the	economic	dependence	of	the	EAEU’s	members	and	their	elites’	






























Patriotic	War’	of	1941–45).	In response to the West’s decreasing activity in 
the CIS area, the Russian strategy will probably prove effective (for ex-
ample, the ongoing subordination of Belarus and the countries of South-
ern Caucasus).	In	contrast,	Russia will not be able to counter the growing 
influence of China	in	Central	Asia.	
During	Putin’s	next	parliamentary	 term	we	 should	 expect	Russian control 
over Belarus to be strengthened.	Russia	already	effectively	controls	the	Be-
larusian	army,	and	probably	has	great	influence	in	the	security	services.	The	
countries’	infrastructure	links	and	economic	dependence	will	be	further	used	
























IV. THE armEd ForcES 
1. The current state of affairs
The principles of the Russian Federation’s military policy,	particularly	in	
the	field	of	the	structural-organisational	changes	and	technical	modernisation	
of	the	Armed	Forces,	have been consistently implemented since the begin-
ning of Vladimir Putin’s rule	in	2000.	Russia’s	military	capability	has	con-
tinuously	expanded	in	favourable	financial	conditions	–	regardless	of	periodic	
economic	fluctuations	–	since	the	beginning	of	the	millennium.	






20082000 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Overall state expenditure National defence*
[billions of roubles]
* These are the expenses listed in the section of the state budget entitled ‘Defence’, although they do not 
cover all Russia’s expenditure on the armed forces
Source: Russian Ministry of Finance, www.minfin.ru 
During Putin’s third term, the growth in Russia’s military potential has 
become a policy priority, not only in terms of national security, but also in 
economic and social terms.	The	rearmament	programmes	being	implement-
ed	(the	so-called	State	Armament	Programme,	 in	Russian	Государственная 




developing,	 or	 acquiring	 from	 outside	 and	 implementing,	 modern	 technol-

































In assessing the current state of Russia’s military capabilities as built up 
so far under Putin, the following transformations in the organisational 
sphere deserve special attention:
•	 the	 concentration of all issues related to the wider defence of the 
territory of the Russian Federation	(including	operations	in	the	areas	
of	countries	bordering	Russia	and	inhabited	by	Russian-speaking	popu-












•	 the	identification of five main strategic directions	(Western,	Southern,	
Central,	Eastern	and	Northern/Arctic),	and the creation of strategic com-

































sequence,	creating effective groups of forces linking operational and 
strategic echelons;
•	 the designation as the two principal strategic directions of the West-
ern	(taking	into	consideration	the	subordination	of	the	forces	and	resourc-
es	subordinated	to	the	Northern	and	Southern	strategic	commands	to	ac-








•	 developing the ability to rapidly mobilise and move large forces of 





As a consequence of these actions, Russia’s military potential should be 
considered as optimal with regard to its declared operational needs.	The	
real	numbers	of	the	RF	Armed	Forces	in	peacetime	do	not	exceed	900,000	sol-
diers.	This	allows	us	 to	assume	that	 the	observed	 increase	 in	 the	number	of	
all-military	tactical	formations,	particularly	the	divisions	in	the	Western	stra-
































changes in the size of the rF Armed Forces (in thousands)
  January 2011 January 2018
Total full-time personnel (formal posts) 1000 1013.6
of which: professional and contract officers 320 225
of which: professional & contract NCOs and soldiers 230 405 *
of which: conscript NCOs and soldiers 300 240
of which: students in military colleges 40 55
* In the period from December 2017 to February 2018, divergent figures on the total number of contract 
soldiers in the RF Armed Forces were given, from 500,000 to 384,000; the second figure is identical to 
that given at the end of 2016. The full-time estimate for 2017 was 405,000.
Source: authors’ calculations
At	the	end	of	Putin’s	third	term,	the	Russian	army	also	had	a	relatively	strong	
tactical air force,	 consisting	 of	 32	 fighter	 squadrons	 (including	 4	 new	 Su-
30	 and	 Su-35	 multi-role	 aircraft),	 24	 bombing	 and	 assault	 squadrons	 (5	 of	
which	are	Su-34s),	8	tactical	reconnaissance	squadrons	and	12	helicopter	bases	




There	 have	 also	 been	 changes	 to	 the	 nature	 and	 structure	 of	 the	 airborne 
troops;	currently	they	are de facto mechanised	formations	with	an	increased	
capacity	for	rapid	deployment,	offering	a	destructive	force	comparable	to	the	






It	must	 be	 recognised	 that	 the	most	 important	 elements	 of	 the	 RF’s	 Armed	
Forces	which	determine	its	capabilities	for	the	deterrence	and	defence	of	the	
state’s	most	 important	 regions	 and	 sites,	 and	which	 in	 the	 political	 dimen-
sion	establish	 the	relative	balance	of	Russia’s	military	potential	with	 that	of	
the	United	States,	 are	 its	strategic nuclear arms, as well as its system of 





































•	 Russia’s	 significant	 expenditure	 on	 the	 purchase	 of	 arms	 and	 military	
equipment	(about	$35	billion	in	2017);
•	 revenue	from	arms	exports	(close	to	$15	billion	in	2017);











This has allowed for investment in a new generation of	technological lines	
(such	as	Sukhoi,	 the	main	 supplier	of	 combat	aircraft,	and	UralMashZavod,	
the	leading	provider	of	tanks)	or	for	new	factories	to	be	built	from	the	ground	
up	(such	as	Almaz-Antei,	 the	main	provider	of	air	defence	missile	systems).	
The	treatment of the technical modernisation of the RF Armed Forces as 



























2. The main challenges
The main challenge in view of Putin’s next presidential term remains 









has been caused not by a lack of financial resources, but	by problems of 
a technical nature. These	have	been	caused,	on	the	one	hand,	by the	breaking	
of	the	ties	of	cooperation	with	Ukraine,	and	on	the	other	with	the	increasingly	
tough	 restrictions	on	acquiring	 technology	 from	 the	West.	Although	during	
the	three	years	(starting	in	2015)	of	the	policy	of	import	substitution	the	Rus-
sian arms industry has achieved self-sufficiency in terms of the compo-
nents and subassemblies it used to import from Ukraine	(this	principally	
concerned	engines	 for	helicopters	and	power	plants	 for	 large	cruiser	 ships),	
restoring military-technical	cooperation with the highly developed NATO	
states should be considered very unlikely	in	the	foreseeable	future.
On	the	other	hand,	there	are	challenges	associated	with	breaking the techno-
logical barriers in designing next-generation weapons	(the	failed	Iskander	








work	 of	 the	 GPV-2027	 programme;	 the	 air-launched	missile	with	 a	 nuclear-























heavy	 intercontinental	 ballistic	missiles.	 Apart	 from	 the	 last	 one,	 these	 are	
completely	new	categories	of	weapons	(even	though	attempts	to	develop	mili-
tary	application	for	lasers	were	made	during	the	Cold	War),	and	as	such,	they	




for	 conventional	 submarines	 (the	 prototype	 Lada	 ship	 has	 been	 in	 so-called	









The partial asymmetry of Russia’s military capability, in comparison 
with the US, remains its greatest challenge.	In	the	development	of	military	
technologies,	Russia	has	made	up	for	most	of	its	lag	behind	the	leading	coun-







































Due to the long-term nature of the modernisation processes,	which	con-
cern	more	than	just	the	RF	Armed	Forces	(as	this	is	a	phenomenon	common	to	
all	high-technology	armies),	any change to the army’s current status should 




tion	 and	modernisation	 as	 observed	 and	designated	 for	 implementation	has	
the	sole	purpose	of	maintaining	the	Russian	Armed	Forces’	offensive	capabili-
ties	while	securing	the	state	it	has	already	achieved.	We	should	assume	that	
any fundamental change in the observed military policy of the Russian 
Federation (and	hence	 the	direction	and	pace	of	 the	armed	 forces’	develop-
ment)	could only be brought about by a long-term economic collapse last-
ing many years.
In	view	of	Putin’s	fourth	presidential	term,	we	should	expect	to	see	the	first	
tactical	 formations	 being	 completely	 rearmed	with	 new	 types	 of	 arms	 and	




In the light of Putin’s next presidential term, the planned organisation-
al increases in the RF Armed Forces’ offensive capabilities should not 





the	 rouble	 against	 the	major	 currencies	 in	 the	middle	 of	 this	 decade	 (while	
Russia	has	largely	been	forced	by	the	sanctions	to	give	up	any	acquisition	of	


































It must be assumed that during the next decade in Russia work will con-













The nature and shape of the RF Armed Forces as achieved during the 
structural transformations at the turn of the 2010s must be regarded as 




while	securing	the	state	it	has	already	achieved.	The general objective of the 
development of the Russian armed forces remains: to prepare for a pos-























aPPEndIx 1. ThE MOST IMPORTANT REPRESSIvE LEGISLATIvE 
ChANGES IN RUSSIA IN ThE yEARS 2012–17
During	Vladimir	Putin’s	third	presidential	term,	a	number	of	laws	were	adopt-
ed	 which	 were	 aimed	 at	 supplementing	 and	 ‘sealing’	 the	 existing	 achieve-
ments	in	the	field	of	state	control	over	society.	These	included	strengthening	
the	control	of	 the	state	organs	over	the	activity	of	natural	and	legal	persons	
(principally	 non-governmental	 organisations	 and	 the	media),	 as	well	 as	 ex-








1. laws targeted at non-governmental organisations independent 
of the authorities








•	 on ‘undesirable organisations’	 from	May	2015,	 concerning	 foreign	and	




























2. laws restricting access to information, targeted at independent 
media, including the Internet. 
•	 	from	October	2014,	on	limiting	(as	of	2017)	the	permissible	share	of	foreign 













3. laws restricting freedom of speech
•	 	from	July	2012,	giving	Roskomnadzor	the right, without the sanction of 











•	 	from	 June	 2013,	 the prohibition of the promotion of homosexuality	
among	minors,	 and	 strengthening	 penalties	 for	 insulting	 religious	 feel-
ings.	This	is	part	of	the	current	stigmatisation	by	the	state	propaganda	of	
























•	 	from	May	2014,	making it more	difficult to publish content on the In-






•	 from	December	2014	on the ‘localisation of personal data’,	imposing	a	le-
gal	obligation	to	keep	the	personal	data	of	RF	citizens	on	the	territory	of	
Russia	alone.	This	makes	it	easier	for	the	special	services	to	access	personal	












•	 from	July	2017,	abolishing the anonymity of Instant Messaging (IM) us-
ers;	as	of	 January	2018,	use	of	a	messenger	app	 is	possible	only	after	 the	
user	enters	a	subscription	number.
4. laws restricting freedom of assembly
•	 an	amendment	to	the	act	on	public	assemblies	and	the	code	of	administra-
tive	offences	from	June	2012,	introducing	high fines for organisers of il-
legal	protests, as	well	as	legal	protests	which	lead	to	damage	to	property	
or	health,	as	well	as	a	ban	on	organising	protests	by	people	who	have	twice	





















































aPPEndIx 2. RUSSIA’S INTERNAL SECURITy INSTITUTIONS 
















































































The estimated size of specific internal security bodies
name of body Size
Federal Security Service 
(including the Federal Border Service)
at least 350,000
Interior Ministry 894,871
Federal Service of the National Guard Troops 340,000
Federal Protection Service between 10,000 and 25,000
Foreign Intelligence Service over 13,000
GRU (military intelligence) about 12,000
Source: authors’ calculations 
Putin’s	successive	terms	of	office	have	seen	the	construction	of	a	model	of	the	
security	 sector	 based	 on	 a	 system	 of	management	which	 is	 centralised	 and	
hierarchised	by	the	presidential	centre	of	power.	These	changes	have	also	in-








•	 strengthening	 the	 analytical-informational	 divisions	 and	 disseminating	
techniques	and	methodologies	for	situational	analysis,	etc.;
•	 improving	the	interaction	between	law	enforcement	bodies	and	the	special	
services,	 and	 their	 coordinated	 participation	 in	 strategic	 directions	 (the	














































































































































The	Main (Intelligence) Directorate of the General Staff (GRU).	The	foreign	
military	intelligence	service.	In	organisational	terms,	it	is	subordinate	to	the	
head	of	 the	General	Staff	and	 takes	 its	orders	 from	the	Chief	of	 the	General	
Staff	and	the	defence	minister.	It	conducts	legal	and	illegal	political,	scientific	

















also	participates	 in	the	 implementation	of	the	Russian	Federation’s	 informa-
tion	security	policy.
The	President’s	Security	Service	(SBP)	 is	also	part	of	 the	FSO	and	has	 its	own	
special	status.	Since	May	2016	the	director	of	the	FSO	has	been	Dmitry	Kochnev.
The	Federal Service of the National Guard Troops (FSGN) is a federal body of 






the	need	 to	 coordinate	with	other	 services.	The	 competences	 of	 the	FSGN	 in-
clude:	the	protection	of	public	security,	participating	in	tasks	related	to	national	





































“new,	 non-traditional	methods	 linking	military	 and	 non-military	measures	
in	a	four-dimensional	combat	space”.	The	emphasis	on	non-military	measures	





































aPPEndIx 3. ThE RISE IN OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION IN RUSSIA, 
2000–17 
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social policy






* These are the only expenditures recorded in the section of the budget named ‘National defence’, howe-
ver, they do not cover all Russia’s expenditure on its armed forces























aPPEndIx 5. ThE LARGEST INFRASTRUCTURE INvESTMENTS 
IN ThE OIL AND GAS SECTOR, 2000–17
Projects implemented




level of use in 2017 
Blue Stream gas 
pipeline





September 2011 30 bcm $15.6 billion 6 bcm 
Nord Stream gas 
pipeline
1st branch 8 Novem-
ber 2011; 2nd branch 
8 October 2012 
55 bcm
(2 branches, 27.5 bcm 
each)
€7.4 billion 51 bcm
Sakhalin-2 gas 
liquefaction plant
18 February 2009 9.6 million tons $20 billion 9.6 million tonnes
yamal-LNG gas 
liquefaction plant
8 December 2017 5.5 million tons (target 
from 2019 16.5 million 
tonnes)
$27 billion 1 million tonnes 
in the period from 
8 December 2017 to 
1 March 2018












25 December 2012 
ESPO I,
Taishet-Skovorodino 
section 30 million 
tonnes 
(expanded in 2014 to 
58 million tons, and 
in December 2017 to 
70 million tons),
Skovorodino-Daqing 
section 15 million 
tonnes (expanded 
in 2017 to 30 million 
tonnes)
ESPO II- 30 million 
tons
$23.2 billion 1st section, 
50 million tonnes 
(including 





BTS-2 oil pipeline 23 March 2012 Initially 30 million 
tons; in April 
2017 extended to 
36 million (in 2012, it 
was planned to extend 
to 50 million tonnes 
in 2013) 
$5 billion 32.7 million tonnes
under construction
“Power of Siberia” 
gas pipeline
planned for 2019 42 bcm Estimated at 
c. €25 billion 
75,5% completed as 
of March 2018 
Turkish Stream gas 
pipeline 
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aPPEndIx 7. RUSSIA’S ARMED FORCES IN ThE WESTERN 
STRATEGIC DIRECTION
In the Western strategic direction, which is of essential importance from 
the Russian point of view, the RF’s Armed Forces have reached a relative 
equality of potential in comparison to the local NATO forces,	as	well	as	the	
ability	to	develop	an	operational	advantage	on	a	selected	part	of	the	European	






























































Changes in the number of deployed all-military operational formations, 
tactical formations and units of the Land Forces of the Russian Federation 
in the Western strategic direction (the Western Military District and the 
8th Army of the Southern Military District in the Ukrainian direction) 
from 2013–17
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
armies 2 2 2 3 4
corps - - - 2 3
divisions 2 2 2 3 5
brigades / regiments 6/7 6/7 7/7 9/13 7/21
Source: authors’ calculations
